Adopting a governmentality perspective, this article explores the multiconceptuality of family in Finnish and Canadian immigration and refugee policy domains by analyzing official and political discourse. Contestation is found to typically manifest as conflict between Western 'nuclear' and non-Western 'extended' understandings of family. We argue that family is persistent in immigration and refugee policies of both countries because it continues to be thought of as an effective tool for biopolitical governance of national populations. A closer reading of the contestation over family also reveals competing neoliberal and neoconservative governmental rationalities situated within broader integration assemblages.
Introduction
The concept of 'family' in the immigration and refugee policies of Finland and Canada is contested among officials and various stakeholders. In Finland existing family reunification policy, and its conceptualization of family, has been recently problematized from various directions. Most visible have been cases where family members of residing migrants received negative asylum or resident application decisions. The problematization of policy also coalesced in Finnish parliamentary debates in Autumn 2010 on renewal of legislation pertaining to integration of immigrants and reception of asylum seekers (L 493/1999; new law: L 1386/2010) . From across the political spectrum it has been argued that integration of persons gaining residence through family reunification has been less successful compared with other immigrants. Critics also argue that the old system of family reunification in Finland is too costly and open to abuse by persons not defined as family of immigrants, and that 'extended' family (e.g., parents and grandparents) therefore should not be recognized in such policies.
In Canada, family class immigration and refugee reunification policy also has been problematized. This is evident beginning in the early 1990s with elimination of the 'Assisted Relative' class and has more recently come to the fore following the federal Immigration Minister's announcement in February 2011 that target levels of 'immediate' (or nuclear) family (i.e., a permanent resident applicant, their spouse or conjugal partner, and children) immigrants are to increase while target levels of extended family (i.e., sponsorship of permanent residents' parents and grandparents) are to decrease.
To the extent that Canadian policy has recognized extended family in the past, emphasis is shifting more towards the nuclear family form.
Drawing on concepts from the governmentality literature, in this article we explore family in immigration and refugee policy in Finland and Canada. We compare Finland and Canada because both are Western immigrant-receiving countries where the nuclear family is dominant, although Finland's immigration policies are somewhat less developed compared with Canada's, which has a longer history of receiving large numbers of immigrants. Nonetheless, these countries also share the guiding principles of multiculturalism policy. Saukkonen (2006) , for instance, has argued that Finland is the European country with an immigrant policy closest to an integration-oriented multiculturalism that has been the Canadian model for almost three decades.
In an era said to be increasingly influenced by neoliberalism's valorization of the enterprising, self-supporting individual (Rose 1992; Rose, O'Malley & Valverde 2006) , the very persistence of a family designation in immigration and refugee policies seems peculiar from the outset. Neither the governmental role of family nor why it is recognized in these policies is self-evident, thus encouraging empirical inquiry into the anticipated governmental roles of family. This policy domain is especially a fertile ground to unearth insights about family as a biopolitical instrument of population (see Dean 2010; Foucault 2007) and as an element of integration assemblages. To this end we ask several questions consonant with a governmentality perspective: How is family represented in immigration and refugee policy in Finland and Canada? How is family being problematized and contested? How is family seen as an instrument of government and what rationalities can be discerned shaping family and ultimately populations in these policies?
Through our empirical examination of legal, programmatic, and other relevant texts we discover that in both Finland and Canada contestation over family typically manifests as conflict between Western nuclear and non-Western extended understandings. In both countries this distinction is found to center on 'from where newcomers have migrated' and 'through what means.' Asylum seekers and refugees -who are primarily from non-Western countries -are permitted to be accompanied by their nuclear family, while other immigrants are allowed to be accompanied by their extended family. In both countries there is a distinguishable move towards further limiting family to the nuclear form. However, we argue that a closer reading of the contestation over family in the two countries reveals that family persists in policies because it continues to be thought of as an effective tool for biopolitical governance of national populations and that two governmental rationalities -neoliberal and neoconservative formulations -can be discerned anticipating the family's role. This article contributes to the governmentality literature by lending further insight into how family figures in immigration and refugee policy as a governmental tool and by illuminating the governmental rationalities that shape family within broader integration assemblages.
Governmentality and the family
This article adopts a governmentality perspective inspired by Michel Foucault's later writings and lectures (see, among others, Dean 2010; Foucault 1991 Foucault , 2007 Lippert & Stenson 2010; Rose 1999; Rose, O'Malley & Valverde 2006) . In this perspective, government refers to the 'conduct of conduct' and is broadly defined as 'any attempt to control or manage any known object' (Hunt & Wickham 1994:78) .
A major concern of this corpus of work has been to identify the governmental discourses or 'rationalities' that shape the governance of populations within and through myriad programs. Rationalities refer to widely shared discourses that give reasons for governmental actions. They are transferable from one societal context to another, but in every context they have their own moral forms, epistemological characters, idiomatic form, and telos (Rose 1999: 24-28) . In this perspective 'program' refers to imagined projects, designs, or schemes of varying scope and ambition for organizing and administering social conduct and that assert knowledge of particular domains (Gordon 1980: 248) . Specific tools or 'technologies' (see Dean 2010: 196-98; Lippert 2010) , of which family is one vital but neglected example, come to be assembled within specific programs, that is, they become enlisted in broader assemblages of governance.
Foucault himself focused upon the transformation of family from self-governing unit within sovereign rule to a biopolitical understanding of family as an instrument of the art of government of the population. From the mid-eighteenth century the family has been an instrument through which governmental campaigns of marriage, public health, and education have taken place. Since then to a great extent family has translated individual interests to interests of population as a governable totality (Foucault 1991 (Foucault , 2007 ). Family is not only an element within population in Foucault's writings, but an important element of the so-called normalizing power that educates members about virtue, promptness, economic responsibility, and self-control. The rationality of normalization comes from both strengthening and maintaining the vitality of population and morality of men, women and children (Foucault 1985 (Foucault :141-83, 1986  see also e.g., Yesilova 2009 ). Family can thus be seen as an instrument through which immigration, individuals, population, culture and economy are governed. Following Foucault's lead, the chief claim of governmentality theorists has been that family was largely supplanted by the population concept. As Hunt and Wickham (1994: 77) described this development:
By addressing population, governments were able to target each individual, as part of the population; the family as the unit of the nation was now clearly insufficient. . . The family was still an important instrument of government, but it was now secondary to the master concept of population.
But what kind of family and how can family be an instrument or technology of government? Although several scholars have examined immigration and refugee policy and practices using a governmentality conceptual 'tool-kit' (e.g., Lippert 2006; Pratt 2005; Pyykkönen 2007; Walters 2002) , there has been only limited attention paid to integration in place of what might be termed 'border practices'. We believe both are important and indeed may be more interrelated and overlapping than previous work has implied.
Moreover, while a few governmentality-informed works have begun to discern or discuss the presence of plural rationalities in particular domains, including neoconservatism (O'Malley 2001; Park & Lippert 2008: 197 ; see also Larner 2000 below), there has been a neglect of the role of family in relation to these sometimes competing rationalities. The general dearth of attention to family in governmentality work (but see Ashenden 1996; Rajas, this issue) and closely related scholarship is somewhat surprising given Foucault's comments above but also since Donzelot's (1979) ground-breaking Policing of Families and early work of Rose (1985; 1987) 
Previous research on family in immigrant integration
There is of course a long tradition of studying families in the context of immigrant integration in Europe and North America (see e.g. , Gordon 1964; Jaakkola 1991; Rex & Tomlinson 1979 and refugee policies and laws. This is followed by sections detailing how family is being problematized and contested in both countries. Of particular interest in this 1998 excerpt, and a point we return to below, is the assumed 'emotional' aspect and the suggestion that nuclear family will provide financial ('economic') support to migrants (there are contracts and other technologies in place that promise to ensure this). But more significant here is the family's role as a tool to secure the emotional well-being of incoming migrants. Immigration will eventually enhance the broader population given dwindling birth rates, but immigration will be more successful if family is first deployed to provide a form of affective and financial security to newcomers. 
Family in Finnish and Canadian immigration and refugee policy

Contestation
These basic trends identified above that involve a shift increasingly away from family reunification and within family designations, increasingly towardss nuclear family, are contested. This is because the sense of extended family is strong among non-Western immigrants, and because humanitarian discourses on immigration In Canada the Canadian Council for Refugees (the longest-standing and most prominent refugee advocacy umbrella organization), from at least 1995 onward, has made family reunification for refugees a priority (e.g., CCR 1995 CCR , 2007 . In a major 1995 report this organization remarked that family reunification should thus be seen not only as something that is done for the private benefit of the individuals concerned;
it also serves an extremely important functional role in helping those involved become financially independent and able to contribute in a positive way to the Canadian economy and the general good of the communities in which they live (CCR 1995: 19) .
Extended family is also recognized:
In the more traditional societies from which many refugees come . . . it is the extended family that serves as the basic unit for purposes of social organization. Grandparents, uncles, aunts and cousins may all play an important part in the care and nurture of children. In some societies grandparents play the most important role in raising children, leaving the parents free to work and earn the money needed to support the extended family (CCR 1995: 49) .
Taken together these discourses deem family to be a basic source of financial support and psychological well-being of individual migrants. There is much agreement that the family is an instrument of emotional and psychological security and that this contributes to economic security. As one Finnish commentator noted: 'The presence of family increases the commitment to work and society ' (Työministeriö 2006: 4) . Thus, the family is thought to work through the immigrant and refugee self and the family's absence will lead to problems in this sphere and in integration and population processes more broadly: 'the stress caused by separation from the family made it extremely difficult for them to concentrate on acquiring new language and job skills that would enable them to become financially independent' (CCR 1995: 18) .
Family is where social and cultural normalization of the newcomer should take place. It is deemed to be the primary site from which the fundamental part of the socialization process commences. The success of the formation of family is evaluated through how -as a functional basic unit -it manages to enlist its members into the host society: drafting children to education and wives to education and labor markets, while promoting the individual migrant's commitment to work life.
Yet almost never entering policy debates is whether family should be considered in selecting and encouraging newcomers to integrate into Finnish and Canadian societies at all. There is virtually no suggestion from state or civil society actors that individuals should immigrate without accompanying dependents or other family members. Contestation is about how family should be defined, not whether family should become part of integration assemblages.
This rarely stated fact about this discourse in both countries is significant because it raises the question of why family might be present in policy in the first instance. Although family discourses stemming from immigration authorities and legislation and that of civil society actors tend to differ remarkably on how to define family, there is a significant like-mindedness on the role of the family in the integration of immigrants: families -no matter whether nuclear, extended, 'rainbow' or otherwise -are assigned a vital role when successful integration is discussed.
Neoconservative and neoliberal family
The contestation described above is partially governmental in Extended family is needed to help those of working age participate in working life by attending to children at home.
Neoconservative conceptions privilege the traditional sexual division of labor in the family, with women remaining in unpaid domestic work at home. Failure to extend family to grandparents is consonant in many cases with encouraging women to remain at home. Neoliberal conceptions, however, presume parents (or conjugal partners) have paid employment outside the home, in which case extended family members become a means of allowing this to happen, in that they potentially remove the need for significant federal state funding for childcare. The neoliberal conception allows for deployment of extended family to the extent that grandparents or other relatives such as uncles and aunts will be enlisted to provide domestic childcare, thus permitting parents to engage in paid work outside home (as commentators have articulated).
In Canadian and Finnish immigration and refugee policy, the question of differences between the two rationalities only rarely touches explicitly upon domestic work and gender roles.
More often explicitly mentioned is the role of family in enhancing individual integration into labor markets and the dominant culture. and fuelled the widespread use of DNA identification (Baldassi 2007) . Neoliberal rationality emphasizes the relatively free role of the nuclear family for the individual self-conduct it is thought to make possible. Thus, the neoliberal conception of family also allows for same-sex parents of children (Larner 2000: 256-7) , which as noted earlier is recognized in Finnish and Canadian policy. This is consistent with the liberal notion of choosing one's own definition of family and contrasts with the neoconservative formulation of a traditional heterosexual nuclear family.
Conclusions
There are similar patterns of definition and contestation over fam- to the state, except to the extent that they will provide free care to children from nuclear family units along with emotional labor, therefore freeing both parents to engage the paid labor market without burdening the state.
There are two other similarities in Finnish and Canadian discourses about the family and in how it is being contested that are worth underscoring. First, although Finland accepts a smaller absolute number of family members compared with Canada (which has had 'family class' immigration for a long period), the relative restrictions and nature of the contestations are remarkably similar. In both, the argument for extended family as governmental is debated by political parties and otherwise is present in political discourse (such as a federal leaders' debate during an election period).
Second, the contestation over family is not only political but governmental in both countries. In other words, family is recognized and touted not only for its inherent value in traditional politics, but also because family is in some way governmental and thus serves biopolitical aims. Our closer reading of this contestation, and to some extent of the shifts in immigration and refugee policy occurring in both countries, is suggestive of the presence of two governmental rationalities: one neoliberal, one neoconservative. Family therefore lies deeply embedded at the crossroads of two rationalities within the complex integration assemblages of both Finland and Canada.
One implication of this analysis is that any serious effort to halt or reverse more restrictive immigration and refugee policy trends noted above and to establish more progressive policies consistent with alternative governmental rationalities in these countries will first require coming to terms with the complexity of family in relation to integration, its varied roles and types, and the formidable intellectual challenge this complexity represents. 
